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We develop a game-theoretic model to explore why retail clusters are so popular in developing economies
and when governments should facilitate the formation of retail clusters to improve social welfare. First, we
find two determinants of retailer clusters: valuation-cost ratio (consumers’ maximum valuation over retail-
ers’ production cost) and retailer density (the number of retailers over unit transportation cost). These two
determinants indicate retailers’ profit potential and competition intensity, respectively. Second, the equilib-
rium cluster size increases in the valuation-cost ratio. This finding explains the phenomenon that clusters are
usually larger in developing economies (where numerous retailers sell unrecognized brands with low profit
potential) than in developed economies. Third, when the retailer density of a product market exceeds a
certain threshold, the market coverages of clusters overlap with each other (i.e., the overlapping case). Fur-
thermore, when compared to the non-overlapping case, the equilibrium cluster size in the overlapping case is
larger for low-profit-potential products but smaller for high-profit-potential products. Together, valuation-
cost ratio and retailer density define four types of clusters: overlapping massive clusters, non-overlapping
large clusters, non-overlapping small clusters, and overlapping mini clusters. Finally, the socially optimal
cluster size is larger than the equilibrium cluster size, and the gap between these two cluster sizes decreases
in the valuation-cost ratio.
Key words : retail clusters; developing economies; valuation uncertainty; valuation-cost ratio; retailer
density; transportation cost
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1. Introduction
A retail cluster refers to a collection of retailers of a particular business sector that are located
in close proximity. Retail clusters commonly exist in developing economies such as Africa and
Asia (Dawson et al. 2005). For example, retailer clusters exist in Jaipur, India (jewelry); Deira,
Dubai (apparel); Urumuqi, China (handicrafts); and so forth. In fact, Shenzhen, China is home
to the world’s largest electronics retail cluster, featuring hundreds of retailers that supply a full
spectrum of electronic products, parts, peripherals, and accessories. In this commercial district,
the majority of retailers in the cluster are small-sized sellers who carry products made by unknown
small manufacturers.
In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model framework to explore why retail clusters are
so popular in developing economies and how the governments can facilitate the formation of retail
clusters to improve social welfare. Our model framework consists of a set of competing retailers
offering products in the same category to a heterogeneous consumer population. Consumers differ
in their physical locations on the Salop circle (Salop 1979) as well as in their valuations for the
product. Retailers strategically decide their store locations on the Salop circle and their prices
to attract consumers. We can then use the resulting equilibrium store locations of retailers to
understand the conditions under which voluntary clusters form. Comparing this profit maximum
equilibrium with the social welfare maximum equilibrium, we provide directions for government
intervention.
To characterize the players and their utilities in our game setting, we recognize several inter-
twining features of the retailing landscape in developing economies compared to those of developed
economies. First, in developing economies, there is a lack of a credible information sharing platform
for consumers to learn about the quality of a product and whether a particular product would fit
their needs, especially with respect to unrecognized brands. Consumers need to visit stores to find
out how much they value the product. For this reason, we explicitly model consumers’ valuation
uncertainty before visiting a physical store.
Second, consumers’ maximum valuation differs in developing and developed economies across
different product types. In developed economies, consumers are generally wealthier and retailers
usually carry products with well-known brands, whereas in developing economies, the consumer
market is largely shared by small local retailers who sell large numbers of unrecognized brands,
especially in suburban and rural regions. Consumers’ maximum valuation for unrecognized brands
can be much lower than well-known brands because of the unknown product quality and customer
service levels.
Third, unit transportation cost also differs in developing and developed economies across dif-
ferent product types. Consumers in developing economies rely largely on underdeveloped public
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transportation systems, which may require them to combine multiple transportation modes for a
single trip rather than use private vehicles or streamlined public transportation systems. Not only
do consumers consider tangible costs like fuel price and fare costs, but they also consider travel
convenience, as reflected in travel time and travel frequency. We collectively define these concerns
as transportation cost, and include it as an important component in consumers’ utility function.
Fourth, the number of retailers differs in developing and developed economies across different
product types. The number may be much higher in developing economies for products with low
entry costs (e.g., small commodities). However, the statement may be reversed for products with
high entry costs (e.g., imported cars and luxury brands).
Fifth, retailers’ production cost may also be different in developing and developed economies
across different product types. For labor-intensive products, the production cost in developing
economies is lower due to lower labor cost. For technology-intensive products, the product cost in
developing economies is higher due to lagging technological development.
To capture the above key characteristics identified for developing economies, we extend the
model in Konishi (2005) to consider a general consumers’ maximum valuation, transportation
cost, number of retailers, and retailers’ production cost in the model. We assume that consumers
are heterogeneous in their physical locations and realized valuations after visiting stores. Before
they visit a retailer, consumers are uncertain about product valuation. Consumers estimate their
valuation, transportation cost, and price to decide which location to visit. Based on this model
setting, we analyze the equilibrium of the game to gain insights and we summarize our key results
below.
First, we find two important determinants of retail clusters: valuation-cost ratio and retailer
density. Valuation-cost ratio refers to consumers’ maximum valuation over retailers’ production
cost. This ratio indicates the profit potential for a retailer. The higher the valuation-cost ratio, the
higher the profit potential. Retailer density, meanwhile, refers to the ratio of the number of retailers
over unit transportation cost. Retailer density indicates the degree of competition intensity within
a product market. The higher the retailer density, the more intensive the competition.
Second, we find that the equilibrium cluster size decreases in the valuation-cost ratio (i.e.,
decreases in profit potential). When the size of a cluster increases, more retailers compete with
each other within the cluster. Consequently, the retail price goes down, driven by the price-cutting
effect within the cluster. When there are more retailers clustering together, there is also a market-
size effect, which attracts more customers to visit the cluster. When the valuation-cost ratio is low
Author: Article Short Title
4 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS
(i.e., profit potential is low), the market-size effect dominates the price-cutting effect.1 Thus, the
equilibrium cluster size decreases in the valuation-cost ratio.
This finding explains the phenomenon that clusters in developing economies are usually larger
compared to those in developed economies. For instance, there are many apparel clusters in both
developing and developed economies. Whereas the cluster size in developing economies is usually
in the thousands or even tens of thousands, the cluster size in developed economies is in the tens
or hundreds. One big difference among these apparel clusters is the profit potential: the majority
of apparel retailers in clusters in developing economies sell clothes from unrecognized brands at
cheap prices, while most clothes sold in clusters in developed economies are usually from well-
known brands. Thus, the profit potential is much higher in developed economies than in developing
economies. Since the equilibrium cluster size decreases in profit potential, the cluster sizes in
developing economies are larger than those in developed economies.
Third, we find that when retailer density exceeds a certain threshold, the market coverages of
clusters overlap with each other, which is referred to as the overlapping case or the overlapping
clustering equilibrium. In other words, when retailer density is high, competition is so intense
that the consumer market is fully covered, and clusters compete with each other for market size.
When compared to developed economies, retailer density in developing economies is higher for
low-entry-cost products, but lower for high-entry-cost products. Consequently, the overlapping
clustering equilibrium is more commonly seen in developing economies for low-entry-cost products
(e.g., small commodities), while the non-overlapping clustering equilibrium is more commonly seen
in developing economies for high-entry-cost products (e.g., automobiles).
Fourth, we find that when compared to the non-overlapping case, the equilibrium cluster size in
the overlapping case is larger for low-profit-potential products, but smaller for high-profit-potential
products. The implications of this finding are the opposite for developing and developed economies.
For developing economies, the majority of products have low profit potential when compared to
those in developed economies. Thus, the equilibrium cluster size is larger for high-retailer-density
products than low-retailer-density products. For developed economies, this finding is reversed, i.e.,
the equilibrium cluster size is smaller for high-retailer-density products than for lower-retailer-
density products.
Together, the valuation-cost ratio and retailer density define four types of clusters: overlapping
massive clusters, non-overlapping large clusters, non-overlapping small clusters, and overlapping
1 In this paper, the market-size effect and the price-cutting effect are the main drivers of our equilibrium results. We
show that the two identified ratios (valuation-cost ratio v
c
and retailer density n
t
) have important moderating effects
on the two main drivers.
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mini clusters. The first two are equilibrium clusters when the valuation-cost ratio is low (i.e., the
profit potential is low). The last two occur when the valuation-cost ratio is high (i.e., the profit
potential is high).
Large or massive clusters are more likely to be observed in developing economies because of low
profit potential in developing economies. Furthermore, overlapping massive clusters are the equilib-
rium results for products with a low entry cost or low transportation cost (e.g., small commodities)
such that retailer density is high. For example, the small commodities cluster in Yiwu, China and
the electronics cluster in Shenzhen, China are both overlapping massive clusters with thousands of
retailers. Non-overlapping large clusters are the equilibrium results for products with a high entry
cost or high transportation cost (e.g., furniture) such that retailer density is low. For instance, in
almost every major city in China, several furniture clusters exist that serve local customers only.
Usually, these furniture clusters are non-overlapping large clusters with hundreds of retailers.
In developed economies, the retail cluster size is larger for low-retailer-density products than for
high-retailer-density products. Overlapping mini clusters are the equilibrium results for products
with a high retailer density, while non-overlapping small clusters are for products with a low retailer
density. For example, stores selling high-retailer-density products, such as pharmaceutical retailers
CVS and Walgreens, usually choose to locate close to customers rather than cluster together at
a central location. Pharmaceutical clusters are very small with either a single retailer or two
retailers at the same location. On the other hand, stores selling low-retailer-density products, such
as automobiles, usually form a small cluster.
Finally, we explore how governments can foster retail clusters and leverage them to improve
social welfare. We find that the socially optimal cluster size is larger than the equilibrium cluster
size, and that the gap between these two cluster sizes decreases in the valuation-cost ratio. This
finding suggests that governments should encourage retailers to form clusters. Since the valuation-
cost ratio is usually lower in developing economies, the benefit from government intervention in
developing economies is more than that in developed economies. In other words, governments
in developing economies should be more aggressive in encouraging clustering – providing various
incentives or subsidies, such as reduced rents, participation grants, tax benefits, and so forth –
than those in developed economies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review relevant
prior studies and discuss the contributions of this paper to the existing literature. We introduce
the model setup in Section 3 and present our equilibrium analyses and results in Sections 4 and
5. In Section 6, we then examine retail clusters from the social planner’s perspective and discuss
policy implications. In Section 7, we extend the model to endogenize the entry of retailers with an
entry cost. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude with a discussion of our findings and possible future
research directions.
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2. Literature Review
The concept of retail clusters is rooted in more general cluster theory. Porter (1998, 2000) defines
clusters as “geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a particular
field.” Based on the structure of the interconnection and business domains, we further differen-
tiate between supply clusters, logistics clusters, and retail clusters. A supply cluster focuses on
producers, manufacturers, and supply networks. Several important issues have been investigated
in this domain, such as cooperation in the supply chain (Schmitz 1999, Deng et al. 2016, Akc¸ay
and Tan 2008), cost advantages of supply clusters (Wu et al. 2006), pricing and quantity policies
in coalitions (Granot and Yin 2008, Nagarajan and Sos˘ic´ 2009, Yin 2010, Huang et al. 2015), and
policy instruments to promote socially preferred choices (An et al. 2015, Bagwell 2008). Logistics
clusters are “geographically concentrated sets of logistics-related business activities” (Sheffi 2012);
these clusters play a very important role in enhancing international trades (Amonkar 2016), gain-
ing competitive advantages in industry (Sheffi 2010), speeding up global supply chains (Elbert and
Scho¨nberger 2009), and planning strategic economics development (Lee and Yang 2003). Retail
clusters are different from supply clusters and logistics clusters. First, retailers in retail clusters do
not cooperate and support each other like suppliers in supplier clusters do. Second, retail clusters
directly serve the end consumer market, for which product valuation uncertainty is an important
factor.
Retail clusters, also referred to as retail agglomeration, have been well studied in the economics
literature. In general, agglomeration refers to the geographic concentration of economic activities
(Krugman 1991, Fujita and Thisse 2013). The general agglomeration literature includes two main
research streams: one stream studies the geographic concentration of diverse firms in urbanization
economies, while the other stream studies the geographic concentration of similar firms in specific
industries. Studies on retail clusters belong to the latter. As the focus of our research is retail
clusters through the lens of operations research and game theory, we center our literature review on
existing analytical studies on retail clusters. For a broader view of agglomeration, we refer readers
to excellent review articles elsewhere (e.g., McCann and Folta 2008, Marianov and Eiselt 2014).
Prior studies on retail clusters attempt to explain why retailers form clusters and explore the
equilibrium cluster size, considering different characteristics of retailers and consumers. We first
identify several key characteristics considered in the literature of retail clusters and then review
existing papers in this area based on these characteristics. Table 1 provides a summary of these
key characteristics and the comparison of existing papers.
Consumers’ valuation uncertainty is a key driving force for retailers to form a cluster. The
underlying argument is that consumers have imperfect information about the exact product fit,
causing consumers to conduct searches to sample available products, during which they incur
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Table 1 Comparison of Papers on Retail Clusters Based on Key Characteristics
Categories Modeling Features 
Eaton 
and 
Lipsey 
1979 
Stahl 
1982 
Wolinsky 
1983 
Dudey 
1990 
Fischer and 
Harrington 
1996 
Gehrig 
1998 
Konishi 
2005 
Takahashi 
2013 
Our paper 
Market 
Structure 
Number of retailers 
𝑛 with 
entry 
𝑛 without 
entry 
𝑛 with 
entry 
𝑛 with 
entry 
𝑛 with 
entry 
𝑛 with 
entry 
𝑛 without 
entry 
𝑛 with 
entry 
𝑛 with and 
without entry 
Number of clusters 𝑘 𝑘 1 𝑘 
1 + 
periphery 
2 𝑘 2 𝑘 
Price competition -- -- --       
Uncertainty 
Valuation uncertainty    --      
Price uncertainty -- -- --   --    
Heterogeneity 
Valuation heterogeneity --   --      
Location heterogeneity   -- -- --     
Revenue 
Potential 
Maximum valuation --  -- --  --    
Cost 
Retailers’ production 
cost 
    -- -- --   
Consumers’ 
transportation cost 
1 𝑡 𝑡 -- -- 𝑡 1 0 or 𝑇† 𝑡 
† 𝑇 is fixed transportation cost. Other parameters 𝑛, 𝑘, and 𝑡 are defined the same way as in this paper. 
transportation costs. Retailers located in the same cluster help expand product varieties, which in
turn increases consumers’ probability of finding desired products.
Another characteristic is price uncertainty. Some early studies assume that consumers have
prior knowledge about product prices before they sample (Eaton and Lipsey 1979, Stahl 1982,
Wolinsky 1983). However, this simplification is only practical under certain scenarios. Since small
retailers in developing economies sell unrecognized brands, price information is largely unknown
to consumers before they visit retailers. Therefore, price uncertainty also influences consumers’
shopping decisions, especially in developing economies.
A third characteristic concerns the spatial aspect of consumers. That is, consumers are from
different locations and incur transportation costs proportional to their travel distance. The unit
transportation cost in this case is either considered unity (Eaton and Lipsey 1979, Konishi 2005)
or as a parameter (Stahl 1982, Gehrig 1998). Other studies have taken a different approach and
model the transportation cost as a fixed cost per trip (Takahashi 2013). The cost of transportation
in developing economies is critical to consumers, not only in terms of tangible costs like bus fare,
but also with respect to travel convenience, especially with larger products like appliances and
furniture.
In the literature of retail clusters, retailers’ production cost has been shown to play a central
role in determining the equilibrium clustering structure. Furthermore, we note that retailers selling
similar products in developing and developed economies may have different costs. However, some
papers (Fischer and Harrington 1996, Gehrig 1998, Konishi 2005) do not consider this factor.
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Some papers in the literature of retail clusters consider number of retailers n as an exogenously
given parameter without entry (Stahl 1982, Konishi 2005), while others allow entry of retailers and
consider n as an endogenously determined variable (Eaton and Lipsey 1979, Wolinsky 1983, Dudey
1990, Fischer and Harrington 1996, Gehrig 1998, Takahashi 2013). Retailers either simultaneously
or sequentially decide if they want to locate in clusters or not. Scholars have investigated a single
cluster plus a periphery model (Fischer and Harrington 1996), the two-market model (Gehrig 1998),
the two-region model (Takahashi 2013), and the multiple-cluster model (Dudey 1990, Konishi
2005). Wolinsky (1983) finds a single-cluster equilibrium and claims the feasibility of a multiple-
cluster equilibrium. Further, it is shown that competition in a cluster drives down prices. Konishi
(2005) refers to this effect as the price-cutting effect, which is not analytically present in some early
studies (see for example, Stahl 1982, Wolinsky 1983).
Our paper is also related to the literature of concentration in retail industries. Studies in this area
investigate the driving forces of market concentration (typically measured by market concentration
ratios) for various industries, such as supermarkets (Ellickson 2006, 2007), online book sellers
(Latcovich and Smith 2001), newspapers and restaurants (Berry and Waldfogel 2010), and so
forth. One key factor considered across these studies is endogenous product quality through firms’
investment in increasing product varieties. Consequently, increased product varieties and product
quality attract more consumers. This effect is similar to the market-size effect of retail clusters.
However, the literature of concentration in retail industries and the literature of retail clusters have
fundamental differences. Specifically, “higher concentration” in the former literature refers to a
larger market share and more product varieties for one specific firm, whereas “higher concentration”
in the latter literature refers to a larger cluster with more independent firms. Since the product
variety decision is made by one firm, there is no internal competition in studies that examine
concentration in retail industries. In contrast, in studies on retail clusters, firms located in the
same cluster compete with each other (i.e., the price-cutting effect), which is one of the key driving
forces of clustering results.
Our model extends Konishi (2005) to incorporate key characteristics of developing economies. In
Konishi (2005), a few simplifying assumptions are made: consumers’ maximum valuation is a con-
stant 1, retailers do not incur any production cost to acquire products, and unit transportation cost
is a constant 1. These assumptions are fair and suffice to demonstrate the main tradeoff between
the price-cutting effect and the market-size effect. However, we believe that relaxing these assump-
tions is critical to capture the key characteristics of retail clusters in developing economies. By
incorporating more general consumers’ maximum valuation, unit transportation cost, and retailers’
production cost, we identify two determinants of retailer clusters relevant to developing economies:
valuation-cost ratio (consumers’ maximum valuation over retailers’ production cost) and retailer
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density (the number of retailers over unit transportation cost). We find that the equilibrium cluster
size decreases in the valuation-cost ratio, and also find that the occurrence of overlapping ver-
sus non-overlapping clustering equilibrium is determined by retailer density. Without the above
three general parameters, the Konishi (2005) model is incapable of distinguishing developing from
developed economies and, thus, cannot make specific recommendations regarding retail clusters in
developing economies. Our study is among the first in the literature to investigate retail clusters
from the standpoint of developing economies’ unique characteristics.
3. Model
In this section, we consider a retail market with n retailers. Each retailer i∈ {1, ..., n} chooses her
store location. Multiple retailers may choose the same store location to form a cluster. We denote
the number of clusters as k. For each cluster Cj, j ∈ {1, ..., k}, the size of the cluster is denoted by
sj and the location of the cluster is denoted by Lj. A list of notation can be found in Table 2.
Table 2 List of Notation
Notation Definition 
𝑛 Number of retailers 
𝑥 Consumers’ location, uniformly distributed on a circle of perimeter 1 
𝑡 Unit transportation cost 
𝑐 Retailers’ marginal cost 
𝑣 Consumers’ maximum valuation for the product 
𝛣𝑖𝑣 A consumer’s valuation for retailer 𝑖 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑛, where 𝐵𝑖’s are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) such that each 𝐵𝑖 is uniformly distributed on [0,1] 
𝛽𝑖𝑣 A consumer’s ex post valuation for retailer 𝑖 
𝑘 Number of clusters 
𝐶𝑗 Set of retailers located at 𝑗th cluster, where 𝑗 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑘 
𝐿𝑗 Location of cluster 𝐶𝑗 
𝑠𝑗 Size of cluster 𝐶𝑗, i.e., number of retailers located at 𝐿𝑗 
𝑟𝑗 Arc distance from cluster 𝐶𝑗 to the consumer who is indifferent between visiting cluster 𝐶𝑗 or 
not. All consumers locating within the arc distance 𝑟𝑗 to cluster 𝐶𝑗  choose to visit 𝐶𝑗 .  
𝑈𝑗(𝑥) Consumer 𝑥’s expected net utility (including transportation cost) from shopping at cluster 𝐶𝑗 
𝑢𝑖(𝑥) Consumer 𝑥’s net utility (excluding the sunk transportation cost) from buying from retailer 𝑖 
𝑝𝑖 Retailer 𝑖’s price 
Π𝑖 Retailer 𝑖’s profit 
𝑆𝑊 Social welfare 
𝑐𝑒 Retailers’ entry cost in the extended model 
 
We consider a unit mass of heterogeneous consumers in terms of their locations, and these
consumers are uniformly distributed on a circle of perimeter 1. As shown in Figure 1, without
loss of generality, the rightmost point on the circle is denoted as 0 and other points are labeled
counterclockwise. This way, this circle of perimeter 1 can be represented by [0,1). Given a consumer
located at x and cluster Cj located at Lj, consumer x incurs a transportation cost of t‖Lj −x‖
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arc distance ฮ𝐿𝑗 − 𝑥ฮ 
0 (1) 
1
2
 
𝑥 𝐿𝑗  
Figure 1 Locations of Consumers and Clusters
when he travels to store location Lj, where parameter t is unit transportation cost and ‖Lj −x‖
is the arc distance between x and Lj.
Each retailer i charges a price pi for her product. For each unit of product sold, each retailer incurs
a marginal cost c, which may include operational cost, production cost, price paid to the wholesaler,
etc. Following Konishi (2005), we assume that consumers are uncertain about their valuations for
retailers before they visit physical stores. Consumers share the same ex ante valuations for the
retailers, but their ex post valuations can vary. To capture this valuation uncertainty, consumers’
valuation of retailer i= 1, ..., n is modeled as Biv, where v is consumers’ maximum valuation, and
Bi’s are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) such that each Bi is uniformly distributed
on [0,1]. Figure 2 shows the timing of the game.
 
 
Stage 1                                                               Stage 2                                          Stage 3 
Retailers decide their physical 
locations simultaneously and a 
cluster is formed when multiple 
retailers choose the same location. 
Consumers decide which 
location to shop at or not 
to shop at all. 
Retailer 𝑖 decides its price 𝑝
𝑖
; consumers’ true 
valuations for all retailers at the chosen location 
are realized, and they decide which retailer to 
buy from or not to buy at all, accordingly. 
Figure 2 Timing of Events
In Stage 1 (retailer’s location choice decision), retailers i∈ {1, ..., n} decide their physical locations
simultaneously. Without loss of generality, we assume that at least one retailer is located at 0. This
assumption eliminates the infinitely many location distributions that are equivalent under rotations
Author: Article Short Title
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 00(0), pp. 000–000, c© 0000 INFORMS 11
on the circle. Further, retailers’ location choices lead to k clusters: cluster Cj, j ∈ {1, ..., k}, with
cluster size sj.
In Stage 2 (consumers’ shopping location decision), given cluster size sj, each consumer chooses
a location to shop at or to not shop at all. Each consumer evaluates each cluster Cj by calculat-
ing his expected net utility from shopping at cluster Cj. Without loss of generality, we assume
Cj = {1, ..., sj}. Each consumer’s valuation for retailers in cluster Cj can be modeled as B1v, B2v,
..., Bsjv, where B1,B2, ...,Bsj are i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed on [0,1]. Following
prior studies in the literature of retail clusters (Stahl 1982, Dudey 1990, Konishi 2005, Takahashi
2013), we assume that each consumer only shops at one location or not at all. The impact of con-
sumers’ potential searches at multiple locations has been studied in the consumer search literature
(Wolinsky 1983). For a consumer located at x, his expected utility from shopping at cluster Cj is:
Uj(x) =E
[
max
i∈Cj
{0,Biv− pei}
]
− t‖Lj −x‖ (1)
where j ∈ {1, ..., k} and pei is the expected price of retailer i.
Consumer x’s expected utility from not shopping at all is:
U0(x) = 0 (2)
Consumer x compares his expected utilities from shopping at all available locations and chooses
the cluster that yields the highest expected utility. If his expected net utilities from shopping at
all clusters are negative, then consumer x chooses not to shop at all. In other words, consumers’
shopping location decision can be represented as:
j∗(x) = arg max
{0,1,...,k}
{U0(x),Uj(x)}, where j ∈ {1, ..., k} (3)
In Stage 3 (price competition among retailers at the same location), retailers in the same cluster
simultaneously decide their prices. Once a consumer visits a cluster, his true valuations for all
retailers in the cluster are realized. For each i∈Cj, each consumer realizes his ex post true valuation
βiv. After visiting retailer i, different consumers realize different valuations for retailer i. Consumers
then become ex post heterogeneous. Across all consumers, the different realized βi values also follow
the same uniform distribution within [0,1] as Bi.
2 These heterogeneous realized true valuations (the
vertical dimension), together with heterogeneous locations (the horizontal dimension), represent
two dimensions of heterogeneity in our model. This modeling approach is consistent with existing
2 This modeling approach is referred to as a fluid model (Huang et al. 2013, Yu et al. 2015), in which the distribution
for ex post realized valuations across consumers is the same as the common valuation distribution that consumers
believed ex ante.
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models with two-dimensional heterogeneity in the literature (Gilbert and Matutes 1993, Desai
2001, Morton and Zettelmeyer 2004, Du et al. 2005, Zhao et al. 2012), which allows us to consider
both horizontal and vertical differentiations simultaneously.
Since transportation costs are sunk, consumers make their purchasing decisions based on their
net utilities (excluding transportation costs) of buying from retailers at the chosen location. For a
consumer who shops at cluster Cj and retailer i∈Cj, his net utility from buying from retailer i is:
ui = βiv− pi (4)
His expected utility from not buying at all is:
u0 = 0 (5)
For a consumer who shops at cluster Cj, he buys from retailer i if and only if retailer i offers the
maximum nonnegative utility among all the retailers in the cluster. If all retailers in the cluster
yield negative utilities, then he will not purchase at all. In other words, his purchasing decision can
be represented as:
i∗ = arg max
{0,1,...,sj}
{u0, ui}, where i∈Cj (6)
4. Equilibrium Analyses
We use backward induction to analyze the game. Subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 examine stages 3,
2, and 1, respectively.
4.1. Price Competition Among Stores at the Same Location
After the cluster sizes are determined in stage 1 and a cluster’s market size is determined in stage
2, retailers inside a cluster decide their prices to compete with each other. Let the cluster size
of cluster Cj be sj and the market size be 2rj. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
1,2, . . . , s∈Cj.
In stage 3, a consumer buys from a retailer i if and only if retailer i offers him the maximum
nonnegative utility among all s retailers in the cluster. That is, a consumer buys from retailer i in
the cluster with the following probability.
Prob [βiv− pi ≥ 0 and βmv− pm ≤ βiv− pi form∈ {1,2, . . . , s} \ i]
Knowing the consumer’s decision making process, retailer i, where i ∈ {1,2, . . . s}, decides the
optimal price to maximize her expected profit as follows.
max
pi
Πi = (pi− c) · (2rj) ·Prob [βiv− pi ≥ 0 and βmv− pm ≤ βiv− pi form∈ {1,2, . . . , s} \ i]
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Every retailer in cluster Cj decides her optimal price. In this simultaneous price competition
game, we find that there are only symmetric equilibrium solutions. Furthermore, the symmetric
price equilibrium is unique. The results are summarized in the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For a given cluster size s, there is a unique price equilibrium p∗i , which is symmet-
ric with p∗i = p
∗
s,∀i ∈ {1,2, · · · , s}, where p∗s solves ps = vs−1 [v− sp+ sc]. Furthermore, p∗s has the
following properties:
• p∗s decreases in cluster size s.
• p∗s increases in consumers’ maximum valuation v.
• p∗s increases in marginal cost c.
All the proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 shows3 that the unique equilibrium price decreases in cluster size s. This is caused by
price competition. When there are more retailers in a cluster, price competition is more intense,
which drives the equilibrium price down. The equilibrium price also increases in v and c. When
consumers are willing to pay more, retailers can charge a higher price. When marginal cost increases,
retailers increase the price to maintain profitability.
Note that the equilibrium price is always higher than the marginal cost, no matter how intense the
price competition is. This is because consumers are ex ante homogeneous but ex post heterogeneous
in terms of their valuations for retailers. Thus, they realize different valuations for different retailers.
Consider an example with two retailers 1 and 2: even if retailer 1 charges a very low price, retailer 2
can still charge a higher price and make positive profit because some consumers’ realized valuation
for retailer 2 is higher than that for retailer 1. As a result, all retailers are able to charge a markup
and still make positive profits.
4.2. Market Size of a Retail Cluster
In this subsection, we analyze the second stage, in which consumers decide where to shop. A
consumer chooses to go to a location that offers him the highest nonnegative expected utility or to
not shop at all. Given a cluster Cj with cluster size s and location Lj, a consumer’s expected utility
from visiting this cluster is Uj(x) = E
[
max
i∈Cj
{0,Biv− pei}
]
− t‖Lj −x‖. Note that this expected
utility Uj(x) increases in cluster size sj. In other words, a consumer prefers to shop at larger clusters
because the retail price is lower and his highest valuation across all available retailers is higher at
larger clusters.
3 Konishi (2005) showed the existence and uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium under more general distributions
of random variable Bis, but he did not consider the possibility of asymmetric price equilibria. Here, we prove that
there is no asymmetric price equilibrium when Bis are uniformly distributed. Thus, our result is much stronger than
Konishi’s (2005).
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Individual consumers’ choices of shopping locations or not shopping at all result in different
demand patterns for retailers. Depending on whether the consumer market is fully covered or
not, there are two cases of demand patterns: the non-overlapping case and the overlapping case.
We use subscripts n and o to denote these two cases, respectively. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the
non-overlapping and overlapping cases for an example of three clusters.
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Figure 3 Non-overlapping case
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Figure 4 Overlapping case
The non-overlapping case refers to the case in which the consumer market is not fully covered,
as shown in Figure 3. Let rn denote the maximum arc distance that consumers are willing to travel
to visit the cluster and obtain nonnegative expected utility. Then,
rn ≡
E
[
max
i∈Cj
{0,Biv− pei}
]
t
.
All consumers within a cluster’s potential market coverage should choose to visit the cluster. In
other words, consumers located within the arc distance rn to the cluster location Lj should be
willing to visit the cluster Cj, unless there are other clusters offering higher positive expected
utilities. Therefore, a cluster’s potential market coverage is rn arc distance from its cluster location
in both directions, and the market size of a cluster is 2rn. In this case, no other clusters yield
positive expected utilities within a cluster’s potential market coverage; as a result, the clusters’
potential market coverages have no overlapping areas. In Figure 3, the arrows indicate the market
coverages of all three clusters. For example, for cluster C1, only consumers located within arc
distance r1 to cluster C1 have nonnegative utilities from visiting it. Therefore, the market coverage
of C1 is 2r1, as indicated by the red arrows in Figure 3.
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The overlapping case refers to the case in which the consumer market is fully covered, as shown
in Figure 4. Consumers located within the arc distance ro to a cluster should choose to visit the
cluster; thus, a cluster’s market size in the overlapping case is 2ro. In this case, some consumers
can get positive expected utilities from at least two clusters, and consumers have to compare the
expected utilities to decide which cluster to visit. Thus, the clusters’ potential market coverages
have overlapping areas. In Figure 4, the dashed arrows indicate the overlapped areas, in which
consumers can get nonnegative utilities from more than one cluster. For example, clusters C1 and
C2 have an overlapping area located somewhere between the two clusters. Consumers in this area
need to compare U1 and U2 to decide which cluster to visit. Let ro denote the maximum arc distance
that a consumer is willing to travel to obtain the higher expected utility from one of its neighboring
clusters in the overlapping case. The indifferent consumer locates at ro arc distance away from C1.
Therefore, the market coverage of C1 is 2ro, as indicated by the red arrows in Figure 4.
We consider symmetric clusters evenly locating on the circle.4 Accordingly, n total retailers can
form k = n
s
clusters with s retailers in each cluster. Since the total arc distance on the circle is 1,
the arc distance between two clusters is 1
k
, which is also s
n
. If clusters are symmetric and evenly
located on the circle, then ro is exactly half the distance between these two neighboring clusters.
Therefore,
ro ≡ s
2n
.
Lemma 2 (Market Size of a Retail Cluster). For a given cluster size s, the market size of
a cluster in the non-overlapping case is 2rn, and the market size of a cluster in the overlapping
case is 2ro.
• Both rn and ro increase in cluster size s.
• rn is independent of n but decreases in t.
• ro is independent of t but decreases in n.
Lemma 2 shows that a cluster’s market size increases in its cluster size. In the non-overlapping
case, this occurs because consumers are more likely to find what they want as the cluster size
increases. Thus, a consumer’s expected valuation from shopping at a cluster increases, thereby
attracting consumers from farther away to visit the cluster. In turn, the cluster’s market size
increases. In the overlapping case, this occurs because the number of clusters decreases when the
cluster size increases. Thus, the distance between clusters increases and competition among clusters
decreases. In turn, the market size of a cluster increases as well.
4 We temporarily assume that clusters have the same size s. This assumption is later validated in Proposition 2, when
we show that the sizes of clusters in equilibrium are very close, with the majority having the maximum difference of
1. This is also consistent with the findings in Konishi (2005).
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Three factors determine the market size of a cluster: the distance between clusters, a consumer’s
expected valuation from shopping, and unit transportation cost. In the overlapping case, the dis-
tance between clusters solely determines the market size while the last two factors do not affect a
cluster’s market size. In the non-overlapping case, a consumer’s expected valuation from shopping
and unit transportation cost determine a cluster’s market size, and the distance between clusters
does not matter.
The number of retailers n affects the distance between clusters. Given cluster size s, the distance
between clusters decreases when n increases. Therefore, the market size decreases in n in the
overlapping case, but is independent of n in the non-overlapping case.
Since consumer demand patterns in the second stage depend on retailers’ location decisions in
the first stage, the non-overlapping and overlapping demand patterns are different. In the non-
overlapping case, although retailers located within the same cluster engage in price competition
(i.e., intra-cluster competition), clusters do not directly compete with each other (i.e., no inter-
cluster competition). In the overlapping case, neighboring clusters directly compete with each
other. In other words, intra-cluster competition exists in both cases, but inter-cluster competition
only exists in the overlapping case. We explore retailers’ location decisions and the corresponding
clustering equilibrium next.
4.3. Retailers’ Location Decisions
In this subsection, we study retailers’ location decisions. If multiple retailers choose the same
location, then they form clusters. Consequently, retailers’ location decisions are connected with the
optimal cluster size that maximizes each retailer’s profit.
In the profit function, the proportion of consumers that buy from a retailer is measured by
Prob [βiv− p≥ 0 and βm ≤ βi form∈ {1,2, . . . , s} \ i]. In other words, knowing that equilibrium
price is symmetric, consumers compare realized valuations for all retailers in the cluster to deter-
mine which one to buy from. Eventually, a consumer buys from the retailer that offers him non-
negative utility and the highest realized valuation when compared to other retailers in the cluster.
We have
Prob [βiv− p≥ 0 and βm ≤ βi form∈ {1,2, . . . , s} \ i] =
∫ 1
p
v
βs−1i dβi =
(
1
s
)
·
(
1−
(p
v
)s)
Therefore, the problem is
max
s
Πi = (p− c) · (2r) ·
(
1
s
)
·
(
1−
(p
v
)s)
(7)
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subject to : ps = vs−1 [v− sp+ sc]
r≤ rn
r≤ ro
p≥ 0, r≥ 0, 0≤ s≤ n
In the profit function, 2r is the market size of a cluster. The condition r ≤ rn ensures that
consumers get nonnegative expected utility from visiting the cluster. The condition r≤ ro ensures
consumers get the highest expected utility from visiting the cluster. Together, they specify that
consumers within the arc distance r to the cluster location should visit the cluster because they
get the highest nonnegative expected utility from doing so. At the optimal solution, one of the two
conditions must be binding. If rn < ro, then the condition r≤ rn binds and r= rn, which indicates
that the clustering equilibrium is the non-overlapping case. On the contrary, if ro < rn, then the
condition r≤ ro binds and r= ro, which indicates that the clustering equilibrium is the overlapping
case.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique s∗ that solves problem (7).
Based on s∗, which is a continuous variable, one can derive the Pareto optimal equilibrium cluster
size, which is an integer. The result is summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Cluster Size). There are three possible Pareto optimal equilib-
ria5. Either all clusters have the same size s∗d, or there are two cluster sizes s
∗
d and s
∗∗
d . The optimal
cluster size s∗d = bs∗c or ds∗e, depending on whichever yields the higher profit. Specifically,
• If n is divisible by s∗d, i.e., (n mod s∗d) = 0, then all clusters have the same size s∗d.
• If n is indivisible by s∗d, i.e., (n mod s∗d)> 0, then there are two cluster sizes s∗d and s∗∗d .
− If Π(s∗d + 1)≥Π(n mod s∗d), then s∗∗d = s∗d + 1.
− If Π(s∗d+1)<Π(n mod s∗d), then s∗∗d = (n mod s∗d). In this case, there is only one cluster
with size s∗∗d ; the rest have size s
∗
d.
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal continuous solution s∗ is very close to the optimal cluster
size s∗d. Furthermore, the majority of clusters have a size of s
∗
d or s
∗
d + 1. Considering the large
cluster scale in developing economies, we will use the continuous solution s∗ to approximate the
optimal cluster size in Section 5 and obtain the sensitivity analysis based on s∗.
5 In the rest of the paper, equilibrium refers to Pareto optimal equilibrium unless explicitly specified otherwise.
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5. Equilibrium Cluster Size and Clustering Equilibrium
In this section, we present two important factors that determine the equilibrium cluster size and
clustering equilibrium. In Subsection 5.1, we discuss one of the two key factors, the valuation-cost
ratio. We then study the other factor, the retailer density in Subsection 5.2. Finally, we show
implications of our findings for developing economies in Subsection 5.3.
5.1. Impact of Valuation-Cost Ratio on Equilibrium Cluster Size
First, we define v
c
as the valuation-cost ratio, which increases in consumers’ maximum valuation v
and decreases in retailers’ marginal cost c. The valuation-cost ratio indicates the profit potential
for retailers. The higher the valuation-cost ratio, the higher the profit potential for a retailer.
Second, we find that the equilibrium cluster size in both overlapping and non-overlapping cases
solely depends on the valuation-cost ratio. In other words, if both v and c increase or decrease by
the same percentage, then the valuation-cost ratio stays the same and the equilibrium cluster size
also remains the same. In both cases, the equilibrium cluster size monotonically decreases in the
valuation-cost ratio. We summarize this result as follows.
Proposition 3 (Impact of Valuation-Cost Ratio on Equilibrium Cluster Size). The
optimal cluster size in both the overlapping case and the non-overlapping case decreases in
valuation-cost ratio v
c
.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows. A cluster has a market-size effect, which is
mainly driven by consumer valuation uncertainty. In other words, because of consumer valuation
uncertainty, a consumer’s expected valuation from visiting a large cluster (which is the expected
maximum valuation among the stores in the cluster) is higher than visiting a small cluster. There-
fore, a large cluster attracts more customers and enjoys a larger market size than a small cluster.
However, a cluster also has a price-cutting effect due to price competition within a cluster. Note
that the equilibrium price is still higher than the marginal production cost for retailers because of
consumer heterogeneity in terms of their realized valuations.
Hence, the equilibrium cluster size is the result of balancing these two effects: the market-
size effect and the price-cutting effect. We find that the equilibrium cluster size decreases in the
valuation-cost ratio, which indicates the profit potential from serving one customer. When the
valuation-cost ratio decreases, the profit potential decreases. For a product with low profit potential,
the improvement on profit margin is limited and, thus, retailers focus more on improving sales
volume. This makes the market-size effect more important than the price-cutting effect when
assessing the tradeoff between them. Therefore, the cluster size increases to further improve market
size when the profit potential decreases (i.e., the valuation-cost ratio decreases).
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One important difference between a developed economy and a developing economy lies in their
valuation-cost ratios (i.e., their profit potentials). For example, in 2016, the average net margins
in the U.S. were 14.18% for computer peripherals and 14.19% for pharmaceuticals, compared
to 1.83% (computer peripherals) and 9.93% (pharmaceuticals) in China (Damodaran 2016). The
valuation-cost ratio in a developing economy is usually lower than the ratio in a developed economy
for most products, due to either high retailers’ production cost c, low consumers’ valuation v, or
both. Consumers are relatively richer in a developed economy than in a developing economy, and
retailers in a developed economy usually sell products with well-known brands. However, retailers
in a developing economy usually sell unrecognized brands. The profit potential is usually higher
for well-known brands than for unrecognized brands.
Our finding in Proposition 3 suggests a larger cluster size in developing economies since the
valuation-cost ratio is lower in developing economies than in developed economies. This helps to
explain the phenomenon of massive clusters in developing economies, as well as the phenomenon
that the majority of retailers in massive clusters sell unrecognized brands.
5.2. Impact of Retailer Density on Clustering Equilibrium
Another natural question is whether the Pareto optimal clustering equilibrium is the overlapping
case or the non-overlapping case. We find that the answer depends on the ratio of the total number
of retailers and unit transportation cost (i.e., n
t
). We refer to the ratio of n
t
as retailer density
since it represents the number of retailers normalized by the unit transportation cost. Retailer
density n
t
measures the degree of competition intensity. When more retailers enter the market (n
increases), the retail competition is more intense; when it is more costly for consumers to travel to
store locations (t increases), the retail competition is less intense.
Proposition 4 (Impact of Retailer Density on Clustering Equilibrium). When
retailer density n
t
is lower than a threshold, the Pareto-optimal clustering equilibrium is the
non-overlapping case; otherwise, the clustering equilibrium is the overlapping case.
The intuition of Proposition 4 is as follows. When retailer density n
t
is very low (due to either
very few retailers existing in the market or very high unit transportation cost), each cluster serves
its own local customers and has limited market coverage. As a result, the clustering equilibrium is
the non-overlapping case, and the consumer market is not fully covered. Consequently, there is no
inter-cluster competition. When retailer density n
t
increases, the number of retailers in a cluster
grows, which intensifies the intra-cluster competition among retailers located at the same location.
Once intra-cluster competition becomes sufficiently severe, the clustering equilibrium switches from
the non-overlapping case to the overlapping case. Retailers would rather endure the increased inter-
cluster competition in order to reduce the intra-cluster competition. From the retailers’ perspective,
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inter-cluster competition is reduced in the non-overlapping case, while intra-cluster competition is
reduced in the overlapping case.
When compared to travel in developed economies, traveling is usually more costly in developing
economies (higher t) due to poor transportation infrastructure. However, the comparison of the
total number of retailers between developing economies and developed economies varies with prod-
ucts. For low-tech product markets with relatively low entry costs, there is a much larger number
of retailers in developing economies (e.g., small commodity markets in Yiwu, China) than in devel-
oped economies. Thus, retailer density n
t
is higher in developing economies for these products. Our
finding in Proposition 4 suggests that the overlapping clustering equilibrium is more likely to be
observed in developing economies for these products. On the other hand, for high-tech product
markets with relatively high entry costs (e.g., automobiles), there are few retailers in both devel-
oping and developed economies. Thus, retailer density n
t
is lower in developing economies for these
products due to high transportation cost, leading to the non-overlapping clustering equilibrium.
Although Proposition 4 shows that the Pareto optimal equilibrium may be either overlapping or
non-overlapping depending on retailer density n
t
, there may exist two possible candidate equilibria:
overlapping and non-overlapping. Proposition 5 compares the cluster sizes in these two possible
candidate equilibria.
Proposition 5 (Cluster Size Comparison). When valuation-cost ratio v
c
is lower than a
threshold, the cluster size is higher in the overlapping equilibrium than the non-overlapping equilib-
rium; otherwise, the cluster size is lower in the overlapping equilibrium than the non-overlapping
equilibrium.
The intuition of Proposition 5 is as follows. Suppose the clustering equilibrium switches from the
non-overlapping case to the overlapping case, i.e., the total market coverage increases from partial
coverage to full coverage. Retailers can do so by choosing one of the following two distinct strategies:
the concentration strategy (fewer clusters with larger cluster size) and the dispersion strategy (more
clusters with smaller cluster size). Following the concentration strategy, more retailers co-locate
together to attract more total customers by taking advantage of the increased highest valuation
from more available retailers at a cluster. Meanwhile, following the dispersion strategy, retailers
locate away from each other and closer to customers to cover more total customers by taking
advantage of reduced price competition and reduced transportation cost.
When choosing between concentration and dispersion strategies, retailers consider the tradeoff
between two effects: the price-cutting effect and the market-size effect. For a product with low
profit potential, the improvement on profit margin is limited and, thus, retailers focus more on
improving sales volume. This makes the market-size effect more important than the price-cutting
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effect, and retailers subsequently use the concentration strategy to increase total market coverage.
Therefore, for products with low profit potentials, the cluster size increases, i.e., the cluster size in
the overlapping equilibrium is higher than that in the non-overlapping equilibrium. On the other
hand, for a product with high profit potential, retailers focus more on profit margin than sales
volume. Thus, the price-cutting effect dominates the market-size effect, and retailers subsequently
use the dispersion strategy to reduce cluster size but increase the number of clusters to increase
total market coverage. Therefore, the cluster size in the overlapping equilibrium is smaller than
that in the non-overlapping equilibrium for products with high profit potentials.
Proposition 5 has opposite implications for developing and developed economies. Since the major-
ity of retailers in developing economies have low profit potentials (i.e., low valuation-cost ratios),
the cluster size is most likely larger in the overlapping equilibrium than in the non-overlapping
equilibrium for developing economies. Conversely, because of the high profit potentials (i.e., high
valuation-cost ratios) in developed economies, the cluster size is usually smaller in the overlapping
equilibrium than in the non-overlapping equilibrium for developed economies.
5.3. Managerial Implications for Retail Clusters
In the previous two subsections, we identified two important determinants for the Pareto opti-
mal clustering equilibrium: valuation-cost ratio (v
c
) and retailer density (n
t
). In this subsection, we
compare developing and developed economies in terms of their valuation-cost ratios and retailer
densities, and then discuss the managerial implications of our findings for retail clusters in devel-
oping economies.
Overall, valuation-cost ratio and retailer density jointly determine the clustering equilibrium.
As shown in Table 3, there are four types of retail clusters (overlapping massive clusters, non-
overlapping large clusters, non-overlapping small clusters, and overlapping mini clusters) depending
on the levels of valuation-cost ratio ( v
c
) and retailer density (n
t
). Our findings suggest that retailers
form either mini or small clusters for product markets with high profit potential (high v
c
) while
they form either large or massive clusters for product markets with low profit potential (low v
c
).
Furthermore, when facing intense competition (high n
t
), retailers form overlapping clusters and
serve the whole consumer market. When the competition intensity is low, it is more beneficial for
the retailers to form non-overlapping clusters and only serve the local consumer market. Next, we
discuss these four types of retail clusters in detail.
Overlapping massive clusters form in product markets with high n
t
and low v
c
. The overlap-
ping case becomes the Pareto optimal equilibrium when retailer density n
t
is high (according to
Proposition 4). The cluster size is large when valuation-cost ratio v
c
is low (according to Propo-
sition 3). Furthermore, the cluster size in the overlapping case is even larger than the one in the
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Table 3 Summary of Key Findings for Retail Clusters
 
Valuation-Cost Ratio (𝑣 𝑐⁄ ) 
Low 𝑣 𝑐⁄  
(Low profit potential) 
High 𝑣 𝑐⁄  
(High profit potential) 
Retailer 
Density 
(𝑛 𝑡⁄ ) 
High 𝑛 𝑡⁄  
(High competition 
intensity) 
Overlapping 
massive clusters 
Overlapping 
mini clusters 
Low 𝑛 𝑡⁄  
(Low competition 
intensity) 
Non-overlapping 
large clusters 
Non-overlapping 
small clusters 
 
non-overlapping case when valuation-cost ratio v
c
is low (according to Proposition 5). Therefore,
massive clusters usually form in the overlapping case when valuation-cost ratio v
c
is low. For low-
tech products with low entry costs (e.g., socks, zippers, and other small commodities), there are
usually numerous retailers, leading to high retailer density and intense competition. In developing
economies, the profit potential is low relative to developed economies due to lagging technologies,
limited purchasing power, poor product quality and customer service, and so forth. In addition,
most of these retailers carry unrecognized brands, which further reduces consumers’ valuation and,
thus, the profit potential of the product. Therefore, overlapping massive clusters are more likely
to occur in developing economies than in developed economies. The small commodity markets
in Yiwu, China represent a typical example of overlapping massive clusters. For example, small
commodities and electronics usually have high retailer densities, which results in the overlapping
clustering equlibrium. Additionally, these products usually have low profit potential in developing
countries. Therefore, massive clusters have been observed for these products in developing coun-
tries, such as the small commodity markets in Yiwu, China and the Huaqiangbei electronics bazaar
in Shenzhen, China. The Mega Center in the Yiwu small commodity markets occupies about 46 mil-
lion square feet (Goodman 2011) and accommodates about 65,000 booths as of 2014 (Chen 2015).
The Huaqiangbei electronics bazaar in Shenzhen, China is another example of overlapping massive
clusters, which is referred to as the “Silicon Valley of Hardware” (Reynolds 2016). Huaqiangbei
houses thousands of sellers of electronic parts, digital devices, gadgets, and their peripherals. For
both the markets described here, the consumer markets (for small commodities and electronics,
respectively) are fully covered by the massive clusters.
Non-overlapping large clusters form in product markets with low n
t
and low v
c
. Some products
require relatively more complex technology (e.g., computer keyboards, video game controllers).
Such technological barriers lead to high entry costs, which limit the number of retailers in the mar-
ket. These product markets usually have low profit potential due to their low consumer valuation,
especially in developing economies. Retailers in such product markets are expected to form large
clusters, each of which serves its own local consumer market; consequently, the consumer market is
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not fully covered. Furniture clusters (e.g., Kanpur Steel Furniture cluster in Uttar Pradesh, India)
represent an example of such non-overlapping large clusters.
Non-overlapping small clusters form in product markets with low n
t
and high v
c
. For products
with high entry cost and high profit potential (e.g., automobiles), the non-overlapping clustering
equilibrium occurs since the high entry cost deters new entrants and the competition intensity is
low. At the same time, these non-overlapping clusters are small because of the high profit potential.
For example, in practice, we observe small automobile clusters in both developing and developed
economies. However, the automobile clusters in developing economies are usually larger than those
in developed economies.
Overlapping mini clusters form in product markets with high n
t
and high v
c
. In these product
markets, overlapping mini clusters are preferred because of both high retailer density and high
profit potential. Pharmaceutical retailers (e.g., CVS, Walgreens) demonstrate an example of such
overlapping mini clusters. Pharmaceutical clusters are usually very small with either a single retailer
or two retailers at the same location. Also, they are usually located close to their customers, and
different clusters compete with each other. Since the profit potential in developing economies is
usually lower than that in developed economies, we expect to observe more such overlapping mini
clusters in developed economies.
In summary, retail clusters vary across different product markets. When compared to those in
developed economies, large or massive clusters are more likely to occur, and mini or small clusters
are less likely to occur in developing economies, due to the lower profit potential in developing
economies. For products with low entry costs, overlapping clusters are more commonly seen in
developing economies than in developed economies, due to a larger number of retailers in developing
economies. For products with high entry costs, non-overlapping clusters are more commonly seen
in developing economies than in developed economies because transportation is more costly in
developing economies.
6. Socially Optimal Cluster Size
In this section, we examine the socially optimal retail clusters from the social planner’s perspective
and discuss the policy implications of our findings.
6.1. Socially Optimal Cluster Size and Its Comparison to Equilibrium Cluster Size
In this subsection, we first solve for the socially optimal cluster size and then compare it to the
equilibrium. In this analysis, the social planner makes location decisions for the retailers in Stage
1, and Stages 2 and 3 remain the same as in the equilibrium analysis. The social planner aims to
maximize social welfare, denoted by SW , which consists of consumer surplus and the profits of all
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retailers. Consumer surplus, denoted by CS, is the sum of net utilities for all consumers. For each
retailer, we know from Subsection 4.3 that her profit is Π = ( 1
s
) · (1− ( p
v
)s) · (p− c) · (2r). Thus, the
total profit of all retailers nΠ = (n
s
) · (1− ( p
v
)s) · (p− c) · (2r). The expected surplus of consumers
who shop at clusters is
CS = (
n
s
)︸︷︷︸
number of clusters
2r
∫ 1
p
v
sβs−1i (βiv− p)dβi︸ ︷︷ ︸
a customer’s expected benefit from a cluster
− 2
∫ r
0
txdx︸ ︷︷ ︸
total transportation cost to a cluster

= (
n
s
)
(
2r
(
p
((
p
v
)s− s− 1)+ sv)
s+ 1
− r2t
)
.
Therefore, the social planner’s problem can be formulated as:
max
s
SW = nΠ +CS =
n
s
(
2r
(
(cs+ c− ps) ( p
v
)s− cs− c+ sv)
s+ 1
− r2t
)
(8)
subject to the same set of constraints presented in Subsection 4.3. Solving the social planner’s
problem yields the socially optimal cluster size s∗social.
Proposition 6 (Socially Optimal Cluster Size). In the non-overlapping case, the socially
optimal cluster size decreases in valuation-cost ratio v
c
.
Proposition 6 shows that the socially optimal cluster size is larger for products with lower profit
potential (lower v
c
) in the non-overlapping case. This property of the socially optimal cluster size
is similar to the equilibrium cluster size.
Proposition 7 (Socially Optimal Cluster Size vs. Equilibrium Cluster Size). In the
non-overlapping case, the socially optimal cluster size is larger than the equilibrium cluster size.
The gap between these two cluster sizes decreases in valuation-cost ratio v
c
.
Proposition 7 suggests that for low-retailer-density products and, thus, in the non-overlapping
case, the social planner should try to increase cluster size in both developed and developing
economies. For developing economies, although the cluster sizes are usually large already, Proposi-
tion 7 indicates a bigger gap between the equilibrium and the socially optimal cluster sizes, when
compared to developed economies.
6.2. Policy Implications for Retail Clusters
Our findings regarding socially optimal retail clusters presented in the previous subsection have
important policy implications for retail clusters. We find that without government intervention,
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retailers tend to form smaller clusters than the social optimum. Therefore, to encourage larger clus-
ters, government agencies are advised to deploy various policies such as reduced rents, participation
grants, tax benefits, etc.
Furthermore, our results indicate that the gap between the equilibrium cluster size and the
social optimum is larger for products with low profit potential. Policies that offer more substantial
benefits to participating retailers in clusters are recommended for these products. In addition,
since the profit potential is usually lower in developing economies, there is a stronger need for such
policies in developing economies than in developed economies.
7. Extended Model with Retailer Entry
In this section, we extend the model to endogenize the entry of retailers with an entry cost ce. A
retailer enters the market if and only if her profit is no less than entry cost ce. Hence, number of
retailers n on the market becomes an endogenous decision. We solve this problem in two steps.
First, we explore the properties of a retailer’s optimal profit as a function of n. Second, we examine
the impact of entry cost ce on equilibrium number of retailers on the market n
∗.
Let Π(n) be the maximum profit function of a retailer, given n retailers in the market. We
use subscripts N and O to denote non-overlapping and overlapping cases in this extended model,
respectively. Let s∗N be the unique optimal cluster size that maximizes a retailer’s equilibrium profit
in the non-overlapping case.
Proposition 8. There exists a threshold n̂ as illustrated in Figure 5. A retailer’s optimal profit
Π(n) has the following properties:
• If 1≤ n≤ s∗N , then all retailers join one cluster, and the market is not fully covered, i.e., the
non-overlapping case is the equilibrium. A retailer’s profit Π(n) = ΠN(n) increases in n.
• If s∗N <n< n̂, then retailers may form more than one cluster, but the market is still not fully
covered, i.e., the non-overlapping case is still the equilibrium. A retailer’s profit Π(n) = ΠN(n)
is a section of a damped oscillating function with horizontal asymptote at ΠN(s
∗
N).
• If n ≥ n̂, then the market is fully covered, i.e., the overlapping case is the equilibrium. A
retailer’s profit Π(n) = ΠO(n) =
ΠT
n
decreases in n, where constant ΠT is the total profit of all
retailers.
Proposition 8 and Figure 5 show how a retailer’s optimal profit changes as number of retailers
n increases. When n is small (less than s∗N), the market-size effect dominates the price-cutting
effect. All retailers cluster together and the cluster size keeps increasing as n increases. When n
exceeds s∗N , the price-cutting effect dominates the market-size effect. A retailer’s profit decreases
as more retailers join the cluster. At a certain point, retailers are better off breaking away to form
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 c
e1
ΠO(n) = ΠT /n
Non-overlapping Overlapping
Figure 5 A retailer’s profit in equilibrium as a function of n
a new cluster. In the new equilibrium, the number of clusters increases and the cluster size is less
than s∗N again. Consequently, a retailer’s profit increases again as n increases. The cycle repeats
until number of retailers n reaches threshold n̂. Then, the market is fully covered and becomes the
overlapping case. A retailer’s profit monotonically decreases in n in this overlapping region.
Proposition 9. There exists two thresholds ce1 and ce2 as illustrated in Figure 5. Equilibrium
number of retailers n∗ has the following properties:
• When ce ≤ ce1, the clustering equilibrium is the overlapping case and n∗ > n̂.
• When ce1 < ce ≤ ce2, the clustering equilibrium is the non-overlapping case and s∗N ≤ n∗ < n̂.
• When ce > ce2, the market is not profitable and no retailers enter the market.
Proposition 9 implies that for products with low entry costs (e.g., small commodities), the number
of retailers is high. The market is fully covered and it is the overlapping case. For products with
relatively high entry costs (e.g., high tech products), the number of retailers is relatively low. The
market is partially covered and it is the non-overlapping case.
8. Conclusion
Using a Salop circle location model and a multi-stage game between heterogeneous retailers and
consumers, we have provided some economic explanations for the wide-spread phenomenon of retail
clusters in developing economies. We have also explored the social planner’s perspective to explain
when governments in these economies should foster these clusters and leverage them to improve
social welfare.
We identify two determining factors for retail clusters: valuation-cost ratio and retailer den-
sity. These two factors jointly determine four types of clusters in equilibrium: overlapping massive
clusters, non-overlapping large clusters, non-overlapping small clusters, and overlapping mini clus-
ters. These four types of clusters correspond to products with low valuation-cost ratio and high
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retailer density, products with low valuation-cost ratio and low retailer density, products with high
valuation-cost ratio and high retailer density, and products with high valuation-cost ratio and low
retailer density, respectively. Developing economies are more likely to have the first two types of
clusters. Below, we review our key findings.
• The equilibrium cluster size decreases in the valuation-cost ratio (i.e., decreases in profit
potential). This finding helps to explain the phenomenon that clusters in developing economies
are usually large because retailers usually sell cheap, unrecognized brands with low profit
potentials.
• When the retailer density is higher than a threshold, retailers form overlapping clusters.
• When compared to the non-overlapping case, the equilibrium cluster size is higher in the
overlapping case for products with a low valuation-cost ratio but lower for products with a
high valuation-cost ratio. This finding has opposite implications for developing and developed
economies. In developing economies, cluster sizes for high-retailer-density products are higher
than those for low-retailer-density products. On the contrary, in developed economies, cluster
sizes for high-retailer-density products are lower than those for low-retailer-density products.
• The socially optimal cluster size is larger than the equilibrium cluster size. This finding sug-
gests that governments should encourage larger retailer clusters.
• The gap between the socially optimal and equilibrium cluster sizes decreases in the valuation-
cost ratio. This finding suggests that developing economies should be more aggressive in
encouraging retailers to form larger clusters.
Our research can be extended in various ways. For example, we can consider more effects from
clustering, such as the bazar effect. In other words, when the cluster size increases, retailers’
cost decreases because of economics of scale (e.g., lower inbound transportation cost for suppliers
sending supplies into the cluster). The bazar effect can be incorporated in our model by modifying
retailers’ cost to c − bs, where b is the degree of the bazar effect. However, making retailers’
cost dependent on cluster size significantly increases the complexity of the model and makes it
analytically intractable. Future work may resort to numerical analyses to examine the impact
of the degree of the bazar effect on clustering results. In addition, it would be interesting to
introduce retailer asymmetry. For example, retailers can be classified into different types such as
major retailers (e.g., Best Buy) and small retailers. Future work may explore the impact of retailer
asymmetry and retailer types on the clustering equilibrium.
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